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Abstract: This paper examines the effects of openness and labor market rigidity on labor market 
outcomes in the manufacturing sector using panel data from 48 developing countries.   Results 
from reduced form equations for employment and wages suggest that on average trade 
liberalization has had a weak impact on  employment and wages.  At the same time, however, the 
effects of trade liberalization in any given country are conditional on the nature of labor market 
regulations: trade liberalization is more likely to have a positive impact on employment and 
wages in countries with flexible labor markets and vice versa.  Additionally, more regulated 
labor markets tend to have higher average wages but these appear to come at the expense of 
sector wide employment. 
                                                 
* I am grateful to Martin Rama for sharing his data on labor market indicators and to 
Natan Elkin and Antonio Soto of the International Labour Office for facilitating access to 
data on ILO Conventions 1.  Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades a number of developing countries have moved to liberalize their trade 
regimes.  Proponents of these liberalizations typically argue that one of the chief beneficiaries of 
greater openness to trade are the workers in these countries.  In particular, given abundant 
supplies of labor trade liberalization encourages producers to reallocate output toward labor-
intensive goods.  Depending on conditions in labor markets, the resulting increase in the demand 
for labor translates into some combination of an increase in employment and/or wages.    
While the logic of this argument is fairly compelling and is generally supported by the 
experience of  the “early” liberalizers –  the Newly Industrialized Economies of East Asia (Hong 
Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) – more recent episodes of trade liberalization appear not to 
have been associated with large improvements in prospects for the typical worker (Robbins, 
1996; Wood 1997).   
There are various factors that may explain the apparent divergence between the 
expectations of liberalization advocates and the recent evidence.   For instance, suppose that 
trade liberalization leads to an inflow of new technologies from abroad.  To the extent that new 
technologies are increasingly skill-biased – as growing evidence suggests is the case – the recent 
episodes of trade liberalization may lead to an increased demand for workers, but essentially the 
small minority with relatively high skills (Wood, 1997).   
Alternatively, the available evidence may be incomplete in important ways.  For 
example, it is widely acknowledged even among proponents of trade liberalization that the short-
run effects of liberalization are likely to be adverse for labor in the aggregate.  Reallocation of 
resources to new firms and industries takes time and it is possible that the available time series 
are simply not long enough to capture the effects of trade fully.  Similarly, the sample of 
  2 countries that have been examined may not be the most appropriate.  Many of the recent studies 
which find limited benefits from trade liberalization for the typical worker have focused on the 
experience of Latin American countries.  Evidence from other parts of the developing world may 
point in a different direction.  For example, Suryahadi’s (1999) analysis of trends in employment 
and wages for labor abundant Indonesia leads him to conclude that these are consistent with the 
patterns one would expect from standard trade theory.  Similarly, Kambhampati, Krishna, and 
Mitra (1997) utilize firm level data from India and find support for the notion that import 
competing firms may respond to trade liberalization by increasing employment in an imperfectly 
competitive setting. 
Still others argue that trade does have the potential to benefit workers at large, but that 
the nature of labor market regulations plays an important role in realizing this potential (Edwards 
and Edwards, 1994).  Thus where labor market regulations impinge on the ability of employment 
and wages to adjust to changes in demand and supply conditions, through minimum wage laws 
or restrictions on worker retrenchment, for example, the potential for trade liberalization to 
benefit workers is likely to be unrealized. 
This paper uses panel data from 48 developing countries to shed some light on these 
issues focusing, in particular, on the relationship between trade liberalization and labor market 
regulations and labor market outcomes.  More specifically, reduced form equations for 
manufacturing sector employment and average real wages are estimated to examine how 
indicators of openness and labor market rigidity are related to labor market outcomes.   
The results are interesting and suggestive – though subject to the usual caveats that apply 
to cross-country analysis of the type used here.  They indicate that on average employment and 
wages are adversely affected in the aftermath of trade liberalization but tend to recover fairly 
  3 soon afterwards.   The recovery is more robust for wages which can end up higher than before.  
Employment may end up mildly below its original level but the effect is generally not 
statistically significant. 
As for labor market rigidity, the estimates of this paper indicate that more regulated (and 
thus by assumption more rigid) labor markets tend to be associated with higher real wages.  But 
the higher wages come at the expense of lower employment suggesting that collective bargaining 
is organized to defend the wages of those currently employed rather than expanding employment 
per se.  Interestingly, the results also suggest that trade liberalization is more likely to have a 
beneficial impact when labor markets are flexible and vice versa.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.   Section 2 describes the channels 
through which trade is believed to effect workers, Section 3 describes the data used in this paper, 
and Section 4 details the empirical results.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Trade and Labor Market Linkages 
The most commonly used analytical framework for understanding the links between trade 
and labor markets is provided by the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade.  Under the 
assumptions of the standard two country, two factor (capital and labor), and two goods version of 
the model the movement from autarky to trade is associated in both countries with an increase in 
the relative price of the good which makes intensive use of the relatively abundant factor.  
Assuming each country produces both good, the relative price of the more labor intensive of the 
two goods will increase in the labor abundant country leading profit seeking firms there to switch 
production toward the labor intensive good while the opposite will happen in the capital 
abundant country.  These changes entail an increase in the demand for labor in the labor 
  4 abundant country.  In view of the model’s assumption of full employment the increase in demand 
for labor in turn leads to higher wages; relaxing this assumption should, however, allow the 
increase in demand for labor to translate into some combination of increases in employment and 
wages with the precise magnitudes depending on conditions in labor markets.
 1   
While the H-O model may be built on some rather restrictive assumptions, the basic 
insight of the model that trade should benefit a country’s abundant factor is quite compelling.  
Nevertheless, the actual effects of trade on labor markets are likely to be influenced by real 
world features which the model in its standard form abstracts away from.
 2  Focusing on labor 
market issues consider, for instance, that while the H-O model assumes an inelastic supply of 
labor, conditions in some developing countries may be better characterized by an effectively 
unlimited supply of workers at prevailing wages in the tradeables sector.  Rightward shifts of the 
demand for labor in response to trade liberalization would then result in higher employment but 
not increased wages. 
More critically, realizing the gains from trade requires that factors reallocate from import 
competing sectors to exporting sectors.  If factors are immobile, however, trade liberalization can 
have counter productive effects. While treatments of factor specificity typically tend to focus on 
capital as immobile in the short run (which by itself would cause wages to decline in the 
                                                 
1  Rodrik (1999) has raised the possibility that trade liberalization may also affect labor 
by making the demand for labor more elastic.  The empirical basis for this possibility is 
weak, however (see Krishna, Mitra, and Chinoy, forthcoming).  
 
2 For example, trade liberalization may have important implications for technical 
efficiency and the set of technologies available for producers in developing countries. 
Thus technology could be skill-biased and benefit primarily skilled workers as argued by 
Robbins (1996) and Wood (1997).  However, trade liberalization may also spur economic 
activity, and thus overall employment and wage prospects.   While the former possibility 
cannot be examined here given the available data (see Section 3 on data issues), there is 
some indirect support for the latter possibility (see Section 4 on results). 
  5 immediate aftermath of a trade liberalization), even labor is unlikely to be anywhere as mobile as 
the standard H-O model suggests.   
To begin with the process of finding a new job even in a growing sector is not trivial.  Job 
searches take time and workers typically possess firm and sector specific skills which are 
difficult to replace/obtain.  Put another way, job destruction may lead job creation by a 
significant length of time. 
At another level, labor markets in the formal sector of many developing economies 
operate under government regulations covering job security, minimum wages, collective 
bargaining, and mandated contributions to social funds.  Although intended to protect workers 
from the vagaries of markets a number of economists believe that these regulations can introduce 
distortions in the efficient functioning of markets and impede reform induced adjustments.   
Legislations which make it difficult for firms to lay off workers, as is the case in large-
scale Indian manufacturing, are likely to impinge on firms’ ability to reallocate resources to new 
lines of production; they may also cause firms to hire fewer workers than otherwise and not enter 
particularly labor intensive product lines in the first place.
3  To the extent that outright disregard 
for these regulations is not widespread, such regulations are likely to impede adjustment and 
dilute the benefits of trade reform for workers as a whole.  
Similarly, minimum wage legislations are often blamed for encouraging unemployment.  
This effect can be exacerbated by trade liberalization, especially since minimum wage 
legislations typically apply to import competing (and capital intensive) sectors.  Minimum wage 
                                                 
3  See Basu, Fields, and Debgupta 2000; Fallon and Lucas 1993; Datta Chaudhuri 1995, 
etc. for such views regarding the Indian case. 
 
  6 legislations could even lead to lower wages in uncovered sectors even if these are the export 
oriented labor intensive sectors (Edwards and Edwards, 1994).
4   
Finally, unionization and the nature of collective bargaining is likely to influence not only 
labor markets themselves, but also how trade liberalization affects labor market outcomes.  Thus 
as Rama (1994) points out trade protection is likely to increase market power and create rents for 
domestic firms, thereby providing an incentive for workers to unionize and attempt to capture 
part of these rents in the form of higher wages.  A decline in trade protection could then be 
associated with reduced rents, diminished incentives and abilities to bargain for higher wages on 
the part of labor, and thus downward pressure on wages.  Alternatively, a union may choose to 
bargain for maintaining its wages at the expense of employment.   Either way, collective 
bargaining can work against the standard H-O type effects whereby trade liberalization would 
increase wages in labor abundant countries.   
It must be pointed out, however, that there is considerable disagreement among analysts 
on whether the types of labor market interventions discussed above have such negative 
consequences on labor market outcomes and adjustment (Freeman 1993).  For example, while 
some regulations may not be binding (minimum wages may be set below market clearing rates) 
others which are may be evaded or avoided without too much effort (Squire and Suthiwart-
                                                 
4  Let trade liberalization lead to a downward shift in the demand for labor in the import 
competing sector (the capital intensive sector in developing economies), thereby reducing 
employment in that sector.  Since wage rigidity inducing regulations typically apply to 
this sector, the employment reduction effect will be larger than otherwise.  Now although 
labor intensive export sector will be able to absorb some of the displaced labor, this will 
only be at the expense of offering initially lower wages to workers.  As capital begins to 
reallocate from the import competing to the export sector wages in the exporting sector 
will increase.  However, whether wages in the export sector and total unemployment will 
ultimately be higher or lower than the pre-liberalization period cannot be determined a 
priori.  See Edwards and Edwards (1994) for details. 
 
  7 Narueput 1997).   Indeed, some analysts go further and argue that labor market interventions can 
even facilitate adjustments by protecting the well-being of workers (Standing and Tokman, 1991 
cited in Freeman, 1993). 
The resolution of these debates is essentially an empirical issue.  The analysis of cross-
country data carried out below may be viewed then as an attempt at asking whether there are 
some empirical regularities relating to openness to trade, labor market regulations, and labor 
market outcomes that can shed light on these debates. 
 
3.  Empirical Framework and Data Issues 
Estimation Strategy 
The strategy adopted here to examine the linkages between trade and labor market 
regulations and labor market outcomes is to estimate reduced form equations for employment 
and average wages using an unbalanced panel of 48 developing countries.  The employment and 
wage equations take the following form: 
  
log Lit = ai + ai1 ln(Tit) + ai2 ln(LRit) +  ai3 ln(Zit)  + ∑at YRt +  εit, (1) 
and 
log Wit = bi + bi1 ln(Tit) + bi2 ln(LRit) + bi3 ln(Zit)  + ∑at YRt  + ηit. (2) 
 
Due to data availability employment (L) and wages (W) are not economy-wide and instead 
pertain to the manufacturing sector for countries, i, and over time, t.
5  T and LR are measures of 
                                                 
5 The data also do not distinguish between workers (for example, between 
skilled/unskilled workers).  Thus it is not possible to examine how trade liberalization has 
effected skilled versus unskilled workers. 
  8 openness to trade and labor market regulations, respectively while Z represents a vector of other 
variables which are likely to effect employment and wages through their impact on demand for 
and supply of labor.  These include real GDP, an index of the real exchange rate vis-à-vis the US 
dollar, and the size of the labor force.   
The estimating equations also include country and time dummies.  These are included in 
order to control for omitted, time-invariant country characteristics and common period specific 
shocks.  Finally, εit and ηit represent error terms which picks up random measurement errors in 
employment and wages, respectively, and the effects of labor demand and supply shocks on 
employment and wages which are not picked up by the included independent variables.  
 
Data and Variables 
The use of country fixed effects to control for time-invariant country specific 
unobservables necessitates that the variables used in estimation vary in the within country 
dimension.  Although this creates obvious problems – many commonly used indicators of trade 
policy and labor market regulations are at best country specific rather than country and year 
specific – there does exist enough of the relevant type of information to allow us to go ahead 
with the analysis.    
Unfortunately, there are significant gaps in the data.  Not only are the years for which 
data are available different across countries, missing information for even one variable requires 
that the corresponding observation be dropped from the econometric analysis.   The panel data is 
thus an unbalanced one.
 6   For the vast majority of countries (39 out of 48) there are at least 10 
                                                 
6   While an unbalanced panel is not really a problem as along as data availability is not 
systematically related to the values of the relevant variables, it does put practical 
limitations on the type of econometric procedures that can be implemented.   In 
particular, dealing with endogeneity issues by using potentially lagged variables as 
  9 years of valid observations; a few have only 5 years of data.  The earliest valid observation is for 
1970 while the latest one is 1997.
7 
 
Employment and Real Average Wages: 
Annual data on employment and average wages are obtained from the UNIDO Industrial 
Statistics Database.
8  While employment is measured by the number of employees or persons 
engaged in total manufacturing (ISIC 300), wage rates are derived by dividing the annual wages 
and salaries paid to employees  by the total number of employees in manufacturing.  The wage 
and salary data, expressed originally in current local currency terms, are converted into constant 
dollar terms by first deflating them by country specific CPI (base year = 1995) and then 
converting the resulting series into constant dollar values by further deflating it by average 
nominal exchange rate values for 1995.
9  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
instruments – since external instruments are difficult to find – becomes cumbersome and 
is not attempted here. 
 
7  The appendix provides a list of the sample countries plus the number of years for which 
key data are available. 
 
8    The sources used by the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database are: (i) data provided by 
national statistical offices through questionnaires; (ii) data added/adjusted by UNIDO based on 
national publications; (iii) data added/adjusted by UNIDO based on international publications, 
and UNIDO estimates that adjust data to the 3-digit ISIC classification; (iv) UNIDO estimates to 
fill gaps in the time series; and (v) UNIDO provisional estimates to bring the time series to a 
more current year. 
 
9  The source for CPI and nominal exchange rates is the Global Development Network 
Growth Database, Macro Time Series (World Bank). 
<www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm> 
  10 Measures of Openness: 
To capture openness this paper uses the two measures of openness which are available for 
the broad range of developing countries and over the fairly extensive time period used here.   The 
first is based on the share of trade (exports plus imports) in GDP while the second is an average 
tariff rate computed by dividing total import duties by the volume of imports.   
As measures of openness to trade these two variables suffer from some well known 
problems and it is important to be aware of these.  Trade shares in particular are likely to reflect 
not only the stance of trade policy but other determinants of trade as well.  For example, it is 
widely acknowledged that trade volumes reflect country specific factors such as size and 
geography.  In addition, high trade volumes relative to GDP may also result from high growth if 
countries with superior economic performance integrate more closely with the world economy.  
A positive correlation between employment and wage growth and trade shares may then be 
driven by the positive effects of economic growth on all three variables. 
Average tariff rates are a more direct measure of trade policy, but even these are not 
perfect.  Since high tariff rates tend to drive the import of corresponding goods down, average 
tariff rates will underestimate the extent of trade restrictions.  Similarly, a widespread usage of 
non-tariff barriers can also restrict the usefulness of average tariff rates as a measure of trade 
barriers.  One way out of the latter problem would be to combine information on tariffs with non-
tariff barriers.  However, time-series data on non-tariff barriers are not available for more than a 
handful of countries. 
At the same time, however, there are some mitigating factors which alleviate some of the 
problems with the above measures of openness.  First, insofar as the trade share variable is 
concerned the usage of fixed country effects in estimation means that it is the within country 
  11 variation of trade shares that is relevant.  To the extent that trade shares fail to capture trade 
policy adequately because of country specific determinants of trade shares, such as country size, 
for example, the  inadequacy of trade shares as a measure of trade policy is alleviated.  Second, 
as Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) point out in their critical review of the empirical literature on 
trade policy and growth, average tariff rates seem to serve the purpose of capturing the 
restrictiveness of trade regimes reasonably well.   
Indeed, it is encouraging to note that although moderate, simple correlations between 
tariff rates, average tariff rates, and a time-invariant measure of non-tariff barriers due to Barro 
and Lee (1994) are in the “right” direction.  Table 1 which details simple correlations of these 
three variables indicates that higher average tariff rates are associated with smaller trade shares 
as one might expect.  In addition, higher average tariff rates are also positively correlated with 
quota coverage.   
 
Measures of Labor Market Rigidity: 
Obtaining variables which capture the nature of labor market regulations for a large 
number of country and over time creates probably the most difficulties in carrying out the type of 
empirical exercise that is attempted here.  As described earlier, labor market regulations blamed 
for creating rigidities typically include legal provisions regarding minimum wages, job security, 
collective bargaining, and mandated benefits.  While in principle it is possible to obtain 
information on these regulations over time and across countries and code them appropriately for 
empirical analysis, in practice this is a very difficult task.  Rama and Artecona (2000) represent 
possibly the only comprehensive effort at doing so; however, their work - some of which is used 
here - is still underway. 
  12 There is, however, one variable which does relate to labor market regulations and is 
easily available across countries and over time.  This is the number of International Labor 
Organization (ILO) Conventions ratified and in force by a country at any given point in time.
10  
These Conventions relate to the terms and conditions of employment and cover a range of issues, 
including the right to collective bargaining, child labor, discrimination in employment, safety of 
working conditions, etc.  Once a country ratifies a particular Convention, it commits to make it 
legally binding.  In this way, the number of Conventions ratified by a country may be taken as an 
indictor of the extent to which labor markets are regulated.
11   From the standard neoclassical 
perspective, then, a country with more (less) ratifications may be considered as having more 
rigid (flexible) labor markets.   
As a measure of labor market rigidity the number of ILO Conventions ratified by a 
country certainly suffers from a number of deficiencies.  First, not all Conventions may be 
equally relevant to the issue of labor market flexibility/rigidity.  Second, even if a Convention is 
ratified its enforcement may be suspect.  This is especially possible since the ILO does not have 
power of enforcement and relies instead on persuasion and voluntary compliance.  Similarly, 
non-ratification does not mean that the country in question does not comply with the spirit of a  
                                                 
10   Founded in 1919, the ILO is the main international body which is concerned with the 
implementation and monitoring of labor standards.  Through a tripartite organizational 
structure, composed of representatives of labor, business and governments, the ILO has 
prepared and promoted  over 180 Conventions covering the conditions and terms under 
which labor is employed. 
 
11   Countries sometimes also denounce a previously ratified Convention.  This is taken 
into account in obtaining the number of Conventions in force at any given time. 
  13 Convention.  For example, as Rodrik (1996; page 16) points out “Few would believe that 
workers are less likely to be exposed to asbestos in the workplace in Cameroon – which has 
ratified the 1986 Asbestos Convention – than they are in the United States – which has not”.    
This paper attempts to alleviate these problems in two ways.  First, it checks the 
importance of enforcement issues by adjusting the number of ILO Conventions ratified by 
interacting them with an indicator of civil liberties and political rights due to Helliwell (1994) 
and used by Rodrik (1996).
12  Countries which safeguard their citizens’ civil liberties and 
political rights are more likely to enforce labor standards which have been written into law.   
Thus while two countries may have ratified the same number of ILO Conventions, the one with a 
higher score on the civil liberties and political rights indicator (which ranges from a low of 0 to a 
maximum of 1) has more enforcement to its Conventions. 
Second, it uses an alternative indicator of labor market rigidity created and utilized by 
Forteza and Rama (2001).  This measure uses information on minimum wages, mandated 
benefits, trade unions and government employment to construct a variable which ranges from 0 
(maximum flexibility) to 1 (maximum rigidity).
13   It should be noted that because this indicator 
is country specific rather than country and period specific, it can not be used as a separate 
                                                 
12  The indicators of civil liberties and political rights are from Freedom House and range 
from 1 (maximum rights) to 7 (minimum rights).  There are then combined into a 
composite indicator by making the transformation: (14-(Civil Liberties + Political 
Rights))/14.   See Rodrik (1996) for details.  
 
13  The Forteza and Rama labor market rigidity indicator is computed by averaging 
individual indicators for minimum wages, mandated benefits, trade union, and 
government employment range, each of which range from 0 to 1.  While minimum wages 
and trade unions can reduce labor market flexibility in limiting the adjustment in wages 
and/or employment, mandated benefits can raise the costs of workers for employers if 
workers do not pay for them.  Similarly, a large share of government employment can 
proxy for a rigid labor market since government employees enjoy various benefits 
including job security and which tend to be demanded by employees in the private sector.   
  14 independent variable in the estimating equations for employment and wages.  Instead, it can be 
used only in interaction with a variable which varies over time. 
Correlations between the ILO Conventions ratified, with and without adjustment for the 
protection of civil liberalities and political rights, and the labor market rigidity indicator of 
Forteza and Rama are described in Table 2.   Not surprisingly, the two ILO Conventions 
variables are fairly closely correlated.   Although not as high, the correlation between Forteza 
and Rama’s rigidity indicator and the unadjusted ILO Conventions variables are moderate. 
 
Other Variables: 
Because overall economic activity is bound to have an important effect on labor demand 
in manufacturing and, therefore, employment and wages, it is important to include a measure of 
GDP in equations 1 and 2.  This is done by using the data on GDP (constant 1995 US dollars) 
available from the World Development Indicators 1999.  Similarly, it is important to control for 
the size of the overall pool of labor available to manufacturing sector.  While the population 
between ages 15 and 65 would be a preferred measure, this paper uses the more readily available 
labor force size as a proxy.  Finally, we also include among the list of independent variables an 
index capturing each country’s real exchange rate vis-à-vis the United States.
14   If trade 
liberalization is accompanied a liberalization of the capital account, associated inflows of capital 
may raise real exchange rates which would, in turn, tend to offset the effects of the trade 
liberalization on the relative profitability of import competing and export sectors.  Alternatively, 
                                                 
14  The index is computed as CPI(local)/(CPI(US)*Official Exchange Rate, where the 
official exchange rate is defined as the number of local currency units per US$ (average 
over the year).   An increase in this index implies a real appreciation.  The data is in index 
form (1995=100) and has been obtained from the Global Development Network Growth 
Database of the World Bank. 
  15 if a trade liberalization is accompanied by a real depreciation the effects of trade liberalization 
would tend to be reinforced.  Either way including the index of real exchange rate movements 
will help disentangle the effects of trade liberalization from those involving exchange rates.  
It is important to note one important limitation of the data, especially that relating to 
employment and wages.  In many developing countries a large proportion of workers in the 
manufacturing sector are employed in the so-called informal or unregistered sector and are not 
captured adequately in industrial statistics.   If production in the informal sector is the more 
labor-intensive one, an expansion of the unorganized sector at the expense of the more capital 
intensive organized sector as a result of trade liberalization will go unrecorded in our data.
 15   
Trade liberalization could then be associated with a decline in employment as it is measured here 
even if in reality total employment in the manufacturing sector increased.  The fact that the 
results of this paper essentially pertain to formal or organized/registered manufacturing should, 
therefore, be kept in mind in interpreting the results.   
 
4.  Empirical Findings 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents some statistics on measures of trade orientation and labor market rigidity 
by region.  The numbers are simple averages over countries in the five regions which account for 
                                                 
15 In India in 1993-94, for example, organized/registered manufacturing (i.e., all factories 
employing 10 or more workers using power, and 20 or workers without power) accounted 
for about 2/3rds of measured manufacturing value added but employed only about 1/5 of 
manufacturing sector workers. Therefore, a large majority of the workforce in 
manufacturing is in the unregistered (unorganized) sector, which also accounts for much 
of India's net merchandise exports (Nagaraj 2000). 
 
  16 a significant number of the sample LDCs for the year 1985 (or closest available year).
16  
According to both administrative (tariff and quota coverage rates) and trade volume measures, 
East Asia has the most open economies among developing regions.  That is, not only do its 
average tariff and quota coverage rates tend to be the lowest, its trade flows relative to GDP tend 
to be the highest.  In contrast, South Asia appears fairly closed.  With the exception of quota 
coverage, which tend to be higher in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), tariff rates and trade shares in South Asia are the highest and lowest, 
respectively.  As for Latin American countries, on average they have trade shares that are fairly 
similar to those of the MENA and SSA country average; but their trade regimes can be 
considered fairly open by developing country standards when one focuses on tariff rates and 
quota coverage ratios. 
East Asia also tends to have the most flexible labor markets as the comparison of the 
number of ILO Conventions ratified (with and without adjustment for enforcement) and the labor 
market rigidity indicator of Forteza and Rama reveals.   In contrast, Latin America tends to have 
the most rigid labor markets in terms of all three indicators.  The other three regions all fall 
within these two extreme, though the individual rankings do differ across the three  measures.    
How are the various measures of openness and labor market flexibility correlated with 
employment and wages?   Figures 1 to 4  plot the average annual growth in employment and real 
wages against various indicators of openness and labor market rigidity.  Because of the cross-
sectional nature of the comparisons, we try to use the longest common period over which growth 
                                                 
16   Only 4 of our sample countries are excluded from this table.  These are Hungary and 
Turkey from Europe and Fiji and Papua New Guinea from the Pacific.  Information for 
all sample countries, including the four omitted in Table 3, are presented in the 
Appendix.  
 
  17 rates can be computed.   While this is 1970 to 1990 for many countries, we do also include 
countries for which the data begins after 1970, making the appropriate adjustment in the 
calculation of average annual growth rates.   
Although employment growth is positively correlated with greater openness (as the 
respective trend lines for average tariff rates and trade shares in Figures 1a and 1b indicate), the 
relationship is weak and statistically insignificant.
17  On the other hand real wage growth and 
greater openness do have a stronger relationship (Figures 2a and 2b). 
Interestingly, a stronger relationship seems to be present between the labor market 
outcomes and labor market rigidity.  In all cases, greater labor market flexibility is associated 
with higher employment and real wage growth and the association is significant at least at the 10 
percent level.   In addition, the two labor market rigidity measures used here (ILO Conventions 
and Forteza and Rama’s indicator) typically ‘explain’ a much higher percentage of the variation 
in cross-country growth rates in employment and wages that do the openness measures.   
Taken together the scatter plots are consistent with openness raising real wages in labor 
abundant developing countries but leaving employment essentially unchanged.  They are also 
consistent with the notion that labor market regulations aimed at protecting workers may induce 
distortions which paradoxically lead to lower employment and real wage growth.  Of course, the 
scatter plots suffer from obvious defects.   They are simply bi-variate associations and take no 
account of the influence of other factors on employment and real wages.  As such they are 
                                                 
17   Although visually the graphs suggest that the positive relationship between 
employment growth and trade share is driven by an outlier (Singapore), this is not the 
case.  In fact, removing the outlier makes the trend line more positively sloped (though 
the trend is still statistically insignificant).   Steeper trend lines also result when this 
outlier is removed in the wage growth versus trade share scatter plots. 
  18 especially lacking in any causal interpretation to the relationships.  To alleviate this problem we 
now turn to the estimates of the reduced form equations for employment and wages.    
 
Employment and Real Wage Elasticities 
Tables 4-7 present results from estimation of reduced form equations for employment and 
real wages.
18  Openness is measured in terms of average tariff rates and the share of total trade in 
GDP.  Both measures are introduced contemporaneously as well as with a one year lag to take 
account of adjustment lags between changes in trade policy and its effects on labor markets.  It is 
worth noting once again that in addition to year dummies, each of the regressions are estimated 
using country dummies.  Thus the resulting estimates are free of any omitted variable bias on 
account of country specific factors, including among other things geography,  and are based on 
variation in the within-country dimension.
19   Of course, they would be still susceptible to 
endogeneity if time-variant omitted factors drive employment and wages and are also correlated 
with openness. 
Consider first the estimates described in Tables 4a and 4b.  In general, the estimates 
indicate that openness has a positive, albeit statistically weak impact on employment, a positive 
and stronger impact on real wages, and that these positive impacts take time to develop.  Indeed, 
not only do the elasticities of the two openness measures have larger absolute values when they 
are introduced with one period lags, the equations which include both the current and lagged 
                                                 
18 Forty-eight LDCs for which at least five years of data are available over the 1970-1997 
period are included in estimation. 
 
19   Thus this is somewhat different from the relationships described by the scatter plots 
which relate changes in employment and wages in the within dimension (i.e., as growth 
rates of employment and wages) to the cross sectional variation in measures of openness 
and labor market flexibility. 
  19 value of openness reveal that it is the lagged value of the openness variables which drives their 
positive impact.   
In terms of magnitudes, the impact of reductions in average tariff rates and increases in 
trade shares are larger (and the effects estimated more precisely) for real wages than for 
employment.  For example, while a one percent decline in lagged average tariff rates raises 
employment by 0.03 percent (an effect which just fails to be statistically significant at the 10 
percent level), it raises real wages by 0.06 percent.  The corresponding elasticities for trade share 
are 0.15 and 0.35 percent for employment and real wages respectively (with both statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level or lower).  
The estimates also indicate that labor market rigidity, as measured by the number of ILO 
Conventions ratified, restricts employment but raises real wages.
20, 21  This pattern is consistent 
with a scenario where labor market interventions serve to raise the bargaining power of workers 
which is used in turn by workers to defend wages even if at the expense of employment rather 
than the other way around.
22 
                                                 
20  Estimation is carried out using ln(1+ILO) in order to deal with observations for which 
the number of ILO Conventions is equal to zero. 
 
21  Results are similar when the ILO Conventions are adjusted for enforcement using the 
democracy variable as in Rodrik (1996) and are thus not reported.   
 
22 It may be noted that while the negative employment elasticity of the ILO Conventions 
is consistent with the evidence from the scatter plots (and the notion that labor market 
regulations may restrict employment growth), the positive elasticity of these on real 
wages is not and suggests that although on average economies with faster wage growth 
intervened less in the operation of labor markets (thereby explaining the negative trends 
in the real wage growth versus labor market indicators scatter plots), the faster wage 
growth was the result of other country specific factors and not the lack of labor market 
interventions themselves. 
  20  
The estimates of Tables 4a and 4b also reveal that an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate has a negative and significant impact on employment and a negative, but generally 
insignificant impact on wages.  Finally, the estimates also indicate that an expansion of the labor 
force is associated with an increase in employment but a decrease in real wages.   This is fairly 
reasonable and is consistent with the effects that shifts in the supply curve of labor would have 
on equilibrium employment and wages.   
While the estimates of Tables 4a and 4b lend support to the notion that the prospects for 
workers in labor intensive countries improves with trade, it is important to note that the estimated 
elasticities on the openness measures are based on regressions which omit any measure for 
general economic activity.   To the extent that openness and economic activity are positively 
correlated, the exclusion of measures of economic activity from the regression equations implies 
that the coefficient  on openness may be capturing not only the resource reallocation effects of 
openness, but also the impact that general economic activity has on labor markets.  Other than 
the extreme case where changes in economic activity are driven completely by changes in 
openness, the omission of  economic activity will lead to biased estimates of the openness 
variable. 
Introducing real GDP among the list of explanatory variables in the employment and 
wage equations, as is done in the regression equations reported in Tables 5a and 5b, gives us a 
way of assessing the impact of openness after controlling for state of economic activity.   As the 
estimated elasticity on real GDP indicates across the various columns of Table 5a and 5b, a one 
percent rise in GDP leads to a 0.70-0.73 percent rise in employment and a 0.87-0.96 percent rise 
in real wages.   This positive impact appears to come, however, essentially at the expense of the 
  21 positive impact of the openness indicators, especially in the employment equations.  For 
example, while the ILO Conventions, labor force size, and the real exchange rate all continue to 
influence employment and wages in much the same way as they do in Tables 4a and 4b, virtually 
all elasticities on average tariffs and trade shares now indicate that greater openness leads to a 
reduction in employment.  However, the negative effects lose their significance when the lagged 
measures of openness are considered indicating that as in Tables 4a and 4b the immediate impact 
effect of trade liberalization is likely to be negative and is moderated over time and may even 
lead to higher employment ultimately.  A lagged positive impact of trade liberalization is 
especially evident in the real wage equations where although the elasticities of average tariff 
rates (current and lagged) remain statistically insignificant across all specifications, an increase 
in trade shares offsets by the second period the initial negative impact on real wages.
23  
In summary, the effects of openness on manufacturing employment and wages display 
some sensitivity to the measure of openness used and the inclusion of GDP as an additional 
explanatory variable in the estimated relationships.  Using trade shares to measure openness and 
excluding GDP from the RHS of the estimating equations yields positive and statistically 
significant effects of openness on employment and wages as standard models of trade would 
predict for labor-intensive countries.  Switching to average tariff rates – a measure of openness 
which is less prone to endogeneity biases – and including GDP as a regressor – especially 
appropriate if GDP growth induces greater international integration – leads to a dampening of 
these positive effects: trade liberalization fails to impact real wages significantly while it does 
lead to some reduction in employment, much of which takes place in the first period of 
liberalization itself.   
                                                 
23   An F-test rejects the null that the sum of the coefficients on current and lagged trade 
  22 Interestingly, this is similar to the pattern found by studies of trade liberalization in 
individual countries.  Rama (1994), for example, finds that a 10 percent drop in nominal 
protection rates in Uruguay led to a decline of 3.8 percentage points in employment.   Real 
wages increased slightly  but the effect was not statistically significant.   
At the same time the estimates also reveal that labor market rigidities, as measured by the 
number of ILO Conventions ratified by a country, have an adverse impact on employment but 
they do raise wages.  While this is consistent with labor market regulations raising the bargaining 
power of manufacturing sector workers and the usage of this bargaining power by these workers 
to defend their wages, even if at the expense of an expansion of employment, it also suggests that 
the effects of trade liberalization on labor markets may vary with the nature of labor markets.  
The latter possibility is investigated next. 
 
Trade and Labor Market Interactions 
The relationships estimated so far introduce measures for openness and labor market 
independently of one another.  While the estimated elasticities shed light on the manner in which 
openness and labor market conditions influence employment and wages, an important question 
for policy is whether the flexibility or rigidity of labor markets modifies the effects of trade 
liberalization on labor market outcomes.  The estimates described in Tables 6 and 7 introduce 
interaction terms between openness and ILO Convention and Forteza and Rama’s rigidity 
measures alternatively and allow us to examine this issue.
24  Since the relevant elasticities now 
                                                                                                                                                 
are zero with P-value equal to 0.05. 
24   Because Forteza and Rama’s measure varies across countries but not time it cannot be 
included as an independent regressor in the fixed effects employment and wage 
equations.  
 
  23 become dependent on the individual data on openness and labor market rigidity, Tables 6 and 7 
also provides elasticities evaluated at the means of the relevant variables and the P-value 
associated with these.   
A comparison between these elasticities and those in Tables 4a-5b indicates a generally 
similar qualitative impact of openness and labor market rigidity.  For example, an increase in 
labor market rigidity as measured by a rise in the ILO Conventions restricts employment but 
raise real wages.  The impact of openness  is also similar to that before although the effects are 
weaker.
25  The more interesting feature of the estimates of Tables 6 and 7 are in terms of the 
direct and interaction terms between openness and the labor market rigidity indicators. 
Consider first the estimates for the employment equations which do not include GDP as 
an explanatory variable (first four data columns of Table 6).  The own coefficient on the 
openness variables are as before: the average tariff rates term is signed negatively while the trade 
share is signed positively.  However, the interaction terms involving the ILO conventions and the 
rigidity measures are positively signed for the average tariff rates and negatively signed for the 
trade shares and in all cases statistically significant.  In other words, the effect of openness on 
employment in any particular country varies with the extent of flexibility/rigidity of that 
country’s labor markets.    
                                                 
25   For example, even in the equations where GDP is not included on the RHS – i.e., a 
procedure which results in the largest positive impact of openness on employment and 
wages as noted above – the effects of openness are statistically significant only when 
openness is measured by trade shares and then only in the wage equation.  Including GDP 
as an additional regressor in the employment and wage equation tends to reverse even 
some of this limited positive effect.  Thus lower average tariff rates or an increase in 
trade shares is associated with a decrease in employment which is often statistically 
significant.  Trade shares continue to have a positive impact on real wages, but the effect 
is not always statistically significant (see Table 7 for details). 
  24 In particular, the estimates indicate that a one percent decline in average tariff rates in a 
country with zero ratifications of the ILO Conventions (the case in Korea until 1991) is 
associated with a 0.28 percent increase in employment.  In contrast, a one percent decline in 
average tariff rates in a country with 76 ILO Convention ratifications (the case in Uruguay from 
1995 to 1997) leads to a 0.08 percent decrease in employment.   The pattern of results are less 
dramatic when openness measures are interacted with Forteza and Rama’s rigidity measure; 
however, the qualitative patterns are similar.  Thus, a one percent reduction in average tariff rates 
leads to a 0.09 increase in employment for a rigidity index value of 0.11 (the case for Jordan) and 
a 0.13 decrease in employment for a rigidity index value of 0.57 (the case for Hungary).  
Results are weaker when GDP is included as an explanatory variable in the employment 
equations (final four data columns of Table 6).  In particular, the direct and interaction terms 
involving average tariff rates are all statistically insignificant.  However the qualitative patterns 
are similar: the sign of the interaction term involving openness and labor market rigidity 
(positive in the case of average tariff rates and negative in the case of trade shares) indicates that 
greater labor market rigidity either tends to negate the positive impact of liberalization (the case 
for trade shares or when average tariff rates are interacted with ILO Conventions) or exacerbates 
its adverse effects on employment (the case when tariff rates are interacted with the Forteza and 
Rama rigidity indicator).   
Turning to the nature of the relationship between openness and labor market rigidity, the 
direct and interaction terms for average tariff rates indicates that a lowering of tariff rates tends 
to raise wages but only in relatively flexible labor markets.  For example, a one percent reduction 
in average tariff rates would raise wages by 0.52 percent (0.24 percent) in a country with zero 
ILO Conventions (0.11 value for the Forteza and Rama rigidity indicator) while it would reduce 
  25 wages by 0.13 percent (0.39 percent) in a country with 76 ILO Conventions (0.57 value for the 
Forteza and Rama rigidity indicator).
26    
This is consistent with the notion that labor market rigidities can lead to lower rather than 
higher wages after trade liberalization (as in the model of Edwards and Edwards, 1994).  
However, it is in conflict with the pattern of results derived from using trade shares as a measure 
of openness.   For the latter, a one percent increase in trade shares leads to a 0.59 percent decline 
in a country with zero ILO Conventions while it would increase wages by 0.51 percent  in a 
country with 76 ILO Conventions.  The pattern repeats itself when real GDP is included as an 
additional regressor and when Forteza and Rama labor market rigidity indicator is used instead 
of the ILO Conventions.
27   
The inconsistency across the two measures of openness is a little disturbing.  However, as 
mentioned before trade shares are more susceptible to be influenced by factors other than just 
trade policy.  Thus suppose that trade policy remains unchanged but that an improvement in 
economic conditions leads to a rise in trade shares, among other things.  It is not difficult to 
imagine that labor would be able to derive a larger portion of the benefits from the general 
improvement in economic activity in regimes which give labor greater power.  Put differently, if 
average tariff rates track changes in trade policy more accurately these will be less prone to 
display relationships which are spurious.  
 
                                                 
26  This is based on the wage equations without GDP included on the RHS.  Results are 
qualitatively similar when GDP is included on the RHS. 
27 The difference is not on account of the different number of observations across the 
equations which use average tariff rates and trade shares. 
  26 5.  Concluding Remarks 
  This paper has used panel data from 48 developing countries to examine the impact of 
openness and labor market rigidities on employment and wages in the manufacturing sector.   
The analysis, which is carried out by estimating reduced form employment and wage equations 
using country and period fixed effects among other controls, highlights some interesting features 
of the relationship between openness and labor markets.    
First, estimates which control explicitly for economic activity suggest that an increase in 
openness leads to a mild reduction in manufacturing sector employment, especially in the early 
stages of liberalization, while leaving average wages essentially unchanged.  Unless greater 
openness plays an important role in promoting growth and influencing labor markets through this 
channel – a phenomena which gets some, albeit limited support in this paper – it appears that the 
labor market effects of trade liberalization are small.   
However, the results also suggest that the impact of trade liberalization on labor markets 
depends on the nature of labor markets in liberalizing countries.  In particular, the estimates 
obtained using the preferred measure of openness, average tariff rates, suggest that trade 
liberalization is more likely to have beneficial effects on employment and wages for workers in 
countries with relatively flexible labor markets.  Conversely, trade liberalization in countries 
with large rigidities in their labor markets may end up exacerbating conditions for workers.   
Finally, tighter regulation of labor markets appears to boost wages but seems to do so at 
the expense of employment.  This finding supports the standard neoclassical claims concerning 
the distorting effects of labor market regulations and suggests that labor market interventions 
intended to benefit workers be carefully designed if they are to benefit the broad group of 
workers as opposed to only certain sub-groups at the expense of others.   
  27 Taken together, these findings suggest that popular discourses on the effects of 
globalization exaggerate (in both directions) the aggregate effects of trade liberalization on 
workers.  Nevertheless, the initial impact of trade liberalization is likely to be adverse, as the 
comparison of elasticities on current and lagged indicators for openness used in this paper reveal.  
Moreover, even a mild downturn in employment in the aggregate may mask significant churning 
of jobs and at least for those who lose or are in danger of losing their jobs the costs of 
liberalization will be large.  In this context, the ineffectiveness of prevalent labor market 
interventions in improving labor market outcomes for workers as a whole is disheartening and 
suggests that introducing genuinely effective ways of protecting the welfare of workers remains 
a key challenge for policy.  
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  30 Table 1: Correlation Matrix for Measures of Openness 
  







Tariff Rates %  1  0.38 -0.37 
 --  (0.01) (0.01) 
     42 48 
       
Own-Weighted 
Quota Coverage (%)    1  -0.28 
     -- (0.07) 
      42 
       
(X+M)/  GDP     (%)     1 
      -- 
        
Notes:  Own-weighted quota coverage is from Barro and Lee (1994).  Data for average tariff rates and 
trade shares is for 1985 or closest year.    Number in parenthesis is the P-value of the corresponding 
correlation coefficient.  Number of observations used in computing the correlation coefficient is below 




Table 2: Correlation Matrix for Measures of Labor Market Rigidity 
  




ILO Conventions  1  0.76 0.59 
   --  (<.0001) (<.0001) 
     48 39 
       




     -- (0.0012) 
     39 





     -- 
        
Notes:  Democracy variable is due to Helliwell (1994) and is as reported in Rodrik (1996).  Labor Market 
Rigidity Index is from Forteza and Rama (2001).   Data for ILO Conventions is for 1985.  Number in 
parenthesis is the P-value of the corresponding correlation coefficient.  Number of observations used in 
computing the correlation coefficient is below the P-value.  
 Table 3:  Openness and Labor Market Rigidity Measures Across Regions 
Region 
Number of Average Tariff 







ILO *  Labor Market 
Rigidity Index 
East Asia  6  8.41  12.88  107.92  11.83  6.42  0.20 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 18  12.52  23.21  56.71  43.72 
 
31.07 0.33 
Middle East & 
North Africa  5  19.07  41.28  57.22  33.60 
 
10.37 0.28 
South Asia  5  21.95  31.70  32.59  23.80  13.39  0.27 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa  10 17.23  32.68  59.22  25.50 
 
7.96  0.22 
Notes:  Source of various variables is as defined in Tables 1 and 2.  Appendix contains a list of all sample 
countries. 
 Table 4a:  Employment       
   ln(Avg. Tariff Rates)  ln(X+M)/GDP 
Openness  -0.01  - 0.01 0.05  -  -0.16 
  (-0.56)  - (0.42) (0.84)  -  (-2.05) 
Lagged Openness  -  -0.03  -0.04  -  0.15  0.25 
  - (-1.48) (-1.47)  -  (3.11)  (3.66) 
ln(1+ILO)  -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.12 -0.13 
  (-2.72) (-2.67) (-2.69) (-2.63) (-2.38) (-2.49) 
ln(Lab  Force)  0.85 0.73 0.73 0.83 0.83 0.80 
  (5.36) (4.36) (4.33) (5.19) (5.16) (5.01) 
ln(RER)  -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.20 -0.16 -0.20 
  (-5.91) (-5.68) (-5.68) (-4.36) (-3.91) (-4.42) 
R-Square  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Observations  720 677 677 714 713 712 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Employment).  T-statistics are in parenthesis.  All regressions include 




Table 4b:  Real Wages       
   ln(Avg. Tariff Rates)  ln(X+M)/GDP 
Openness  -0.04 -  -0.01  0.21 -  -0.16 
  (-1.53) -  (-0.23)  (3.34) -  (-1.84) 
Lagged  Openness  - -0.06 -0.06  -  0.35  0.46 
  - (-2.40) (-1.89)  -  (6.47)  (5.94) 
ln(1+ILO)  0.15 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.20 
  (2.48) (2.49) (2.50) (3.01) (3.34) (3.42) 
ln(Lab  Force)  -0.82 -0.95 -0.95 -0.82 -0.82 -0.85 
  (-4.40) (-4.93) (-4.90) (-4.38) (-4.45) (-4.62) 
ln(RER)  -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01  0.04  0.00 
  (-2.21) (-1.33) (-1.28) (-0.10)  (0.81) (-0.08) 
R-Square  0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
Observations  720 677 677 714 713 712 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Real Wages).  T-statistics are in parenthesis.  All regressions include 
country and year dummies.    Table 5a:  Employment       
   ln(Avg. Tariff Rates)  ln (X+M)/GDP 
Openness 0.04  -  0.03  -0.08  -  -0.14 
  (1.86) -  (1.24)  (-1.69) -  (-2.00) 
Lagged Openness  -  0.03  0.01  -  -0.01  0.07 
  - (1.39) (0.54)  -  (-0.26) (1.12) 
Ln(1+ILO)  -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 -0.18 
  (-3.84) (-3.79) (-3.87) (-4.00) (-3.67) (-3.92) 
Ln(Lab  Force)  0.59 0.56 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.57 
  (4.21) (3.75) (3.67) (4.13) (4.15) (4.02) 
Ln(RER)  -0.20 -0.19 -0.19 -0.23 -0.19 -0.23 
  (-5.99) (-5.53) (-5.65) (-5.55) (-5.19) (-5.55) 
Ln(GDP)  0.71 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.71 
  (13.91) (13.34) (13.40) (13.92) (13.14) (13.23) 
R-Square  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Observations  720 677 677 714 713 712 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Employment).  T-statistics are in parenthesis.  All regressions include 




Table 5b:  Real Wages       
   ln(Avg. Tariff Rates)  ln (X+M)/GDP 
Openness  0.03  - 0.02 0.05  -  -0.13 
  (1.14)  - (0.64) (0.92)  -  (-1.77) 
Lagged  Openness  - 0.02 0.01  - 0.15 0.24 
  - (0.89) (0.42)  - (3.12) (3.51) 
Ln(1+ILO)  0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.14 
  (2.07) (2.07) (2.01) (2.40) (2.75) (2.70) 
Ln(Lab  Force)  -1.17 -1.18 -1.19 -1.13 -1.11 -1.13 
  (-7.37) (-7.34) (-7.36) (-7.06) (-6.94) (-7.04) 
Ln(RER)  -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04  0.00 -0.03 
  (-1.76) (-0.47) (-0.55) (-0.76)  (0.05) (-0.70) 
Ln(GDP)  0.94 0.96 0.96 0.91 0.88 0.87 
  (16.38) (16.25) (16.25) (15.51) (14.78) (14.46) 
R-Square  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Observations  720 677 677 714 713 712 
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Real Wages).  T-statistics are in parenthesis.  All regressions include 






 Table 6:  Employment 
   In(Avg. Tariff Rates)  In(X+M)/GDP  In(Avg. Tariff Rates)  In(X+M)/GDP 
Openness                  -0.28 -0.15 1.09 0.48 -0.01 0.02 0.77 0.11
  (-3.33)               
         
               
                 
               
       
           
                 
               
                 
               
   
         
               










-0.32 - 1.21 - -0.21 - 0.92 -
(-4.28) - (4.97) - (-3.06) - (4.26) -
Openness*ln(1+ILO)
 












Openness*Rigidity - 0.49 - -1.81 - 0.03 - -0.73
- (2.36)  (-3.75) -   (0.16) -   (-1.74) -
ln(Lab  Force)
 
0.85 1.05 0.76 1.04 0.59 0.87 0.53 0.87
(5.36) (6.11) (4.84) (6.06) (4.22) (5.85) (3.83) (5.85)
ln(RER)
 
















- - - - 0.70 0.75 0.70 0.76
- - - - (13.41)  (14.06)  (13.70)  (13.91)
Mean Trade Elasticity  -0.007  -0.012  0.005  -0.014  0.037  0.026  -0.110  -0.091 
P-value for Trade Elasticity  0.75  0.59  0.92  0.81  0.06  0.19  0.02  0.07 
Mean ILO Elasticity  -0.122  -  -0.113  -  -0.170  -  -0.162  - 
P-value for ILO Elasticity 
 
0.02  -  0.03  -  0.00  -  0.00  - 
R-Square 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Observations  720 624 714 618 720 624 714 618
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Employment).  Rigidity is the Forteza and Rama indicator of labor market rigidity. 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. All regressions include country and year dummies. Table 7:  Real Wages 
   In(Avg. Tariff Rates)  In(X+M)/GDP  In(Avg. Tariff Rates)  In(X+M)/GDP 
Openness                  -0.52 -0.39 -0.59 0.20 -0.16 -0.17 -1.01 -0.31
     
           
           
             
         
         
               
                 
               
             
     
     
         
               
               
(-5.19)  (-2.60) (-5.61)  (1.23)   (-1.86)   (-2.96)   (-5.29)   (-2.29)
ln(1+ILO) -0.17 -  -0.85 -  -0.02 -  -1.24 -
(-1.97)  (-2.96)
 
-   (-0.27)
 
-   (-5.14) - -
Openness*ln(1+ILO)
 





-   (2.23)
 





- 1.36 - 0.09 - 0.77 - 1.56
- (5.61) - (0.16) - (3.77) - (3.24)
ln(Lab  Force)
 





(-7.36) (-7.43) (-6.81) (-7.02)









  (-2.06)   (-2.86)
 
  (0.56)   (-0.61)
  ln(GDP)
 
- - - - 0.91 0.98 0.94 1.04
- - - - (15.53)  (16.20)  (16.34)  (16.60)
Mean Trade Elasticity  -0.03  -0.012  0.24  0.224  0.027  0.038  0.086  0.119 
P-value for Trade Elasticity  0.24  0.67  0.00  0.00  0.22  0.09  0.11  0.04 
Mean ILO Elasticity  0.18  -  0.16  -  0.119  -  0.098  - 
P-value for ILO Elasticity 
 
0.00  -  0.01  -  0.02  -  0.05  - 
R-Square 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Observations  720 624 714 618 720 624 714 618
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(Real Wages).  Rigidity is the Forteza and Rama indicator of labor market rigidity. 





































Index  RER* 
Argentina        11  1981  1993  2,279.26  117.16 10.73  15,579  14.75  15.45 62.00  0.38  53.67
Bangladesh                         
       
                         
     
                       
     
                         
                         
                         
   
                       
        
                         
       
                       
       
                       
       
                       
     
     
                         
     
                       
                       
       
       
16 1974 1989 213.88 426.11
 
4.58 708 14.77 16.66 30.38 0.33
   
134.89
Barbados 18  1972  1989  14.77 1.12 0.09  8,740  10.00  122.95 33.00. 90.81
Bolivia 13 1985 1997 58.18 26.90 0.37 2,394 7.49 46.87 40.00 0.29 106.35
Brazil 5  1985 1994  6,142.09
 
  662.13  40.80  8,873  8.28  18.41  62.40  0.28  82.2
Cameroon 12 1975 1995 68.97 38.76 0.52 5,787 22.08 51.01 38.83. 118.77
Chile 13  1975  1987  253.52  39.54 2.01  6,267  11.77  48.53  39.08  0.15  120.55
Colombia 24 1971 1994 496.95 108.58 4.76 3,692 14.08 30.18 45.67 0.3 105.85
Costa  Rica 13 1984 1996 73.23 11.42 1.31 3,542 11.53 75.85 43.85 0.41 95.11
Dominican  Rep.
 
13 1972 1985 68.28 19.91 1.33 2,304 21.51 47.73 25.85 0.42 149.17
Ecuador
 
19  1976  1994  136.41  31.06 1.06  4,494  14.70  51.61  49.68  0.32  124.03
Egypt 21 1975 1995 392.17 164.45 9.47 2,519 26.72 58.27 48.71 0.39
 
134.2
Fiji 14  1979 1992  15.65  2.34 0.15  5,003  17.66  100.48  17.00. 108.12
Ghana 10 1975 1984 40.14 50.71 0.76 742 21.13 19.64 40.00 0.23 721.61
Guatemala
 
6  1977  1982  104.21  22.93 0.78  2,813  7.75  44.65 39.00  0.3  142.59
Haiti 9 1975 1983 29.10 25.28 0.24 2,025 13.41 46.72 22.44. 93.79
Hungary
 
16  1982  1997  475.59  48.48 10.54  3,819  8.88  73.27 48.56  0.57  78.04
India 22 1974 1996 2,095.66 3,332.40 69.32 1,046 35.36 17.42 32.14 0.22 158.76
Indonesia
 
16  1981  1996  1,333.86  754.89 24.03  1,031  4.66  49.23 8.75  0.13  117.35
Iran 7 1976 1983 659.97 116.89 4.83 5,649 17.54 40.46 11.00. 240.09
Jamaica 7  1976  1984  33.03  9.49 0.46  5,915  5.23  85.92  23.29  0.28  169.16
Jordan 21  1975  1995  43.83  7.24 0.41  3,911  15.70  122.61  16.43  0.11  134.02
Kenya 21 1975 1996 67.45 97.98 1.63 127 15.58 60.02 36.57
 
0.15 105.12
Korea 21  1976  1996  2,514.28
 
  180.50 24.90  9,256  7.58  66.29 0.86  0.17  89.94
Madagascar
 
5 1978 1982 28.56 43.33 0.44 1,403 18.68 39.09 28.00 0.28 240.89
Malawi 11 1980 1990 11.21 36.03 0.33 1,092 23.11 55.06 20.82. 147.37
Malaysia 23  1974  1996  471.78  62.27
 
6.70  3,671  7.03  125.50 10.70  0.18  110.76
Mauritius 22  1976  1997  27.03 4.00 0.82  2,580  16.72  116.15 29.82  0.34  102.36Mexico     
       
                       
                         
     
                       
       
                         
                       
       
                     
                       
                       
     
     
       
       
                         
13  1984  1996  2,653.80  308.43 9.05  5,091  5.34  38.20  65.38  0.33  116.31
Morocco
 
20  1976  1995  262.18  80.95 2.95  4,635  18.06  53.96 39.05  0.24  103.83
Nepal 9 1977 1996 33.09 85.03 1.52 369 12.45 36.21 4.11. 129.28
Pakistan 19 1973 1992 323.96 314.45 4.95 1,445 24.73 33.15 29.00 0.28 144.38
Panama
 
18  1977  1994  60.58  8.19 0.34  5,821  4.38  159.61  69.06  0.45  127.56
PNG 11 1976 1989 32.44 16.46 0.21 6,037 11.73 92.82 19.00. 120.05
Peru 15  1979 1994  490.08  65.78 2.70  10,740  18.19  31.73  63.40  0.28  52.8
Philippines
 
21 1977 1997 623.64 234.01 8.73 2,567 14.36 59.95 22.05 0.33 91.97
Senegal 9 1974 1983 31.31 24.79 0.30 4,023 20.88 78.88 31.78 0.32 156.71
Singapore 26  1972  1997  441.28  11.77 2.87  12,771  0.83  354.36 20.27  0.22  86.22
South Africa 
 
18  1976  1996  1,188.78 
 
123.71  14.32  9,184  5.15  52.01  10.11  0.12  103.57 
Sri  Lanka 15 1980 1994 91.47 63.90 2.71 781 14.32 69.67 23.93 0.26 96.36
Syrian Arab Rep. 
 
11  1977  1995  105.96  29.71  1.42  9,214  15.68  52.90  45.36  0.39  66.66 
Thailand
 
13 1975 1994 832.04 279.45 12.34 3,010 12.17 60.13 11.00 0.15 98.77
Togo 5 1977 1983 10.52 11.37 0.04 3,170 16.20 112.41 13.00. 161.93
Trinidad and 
Tobago 7  1976  1995  46.39  4.53 0.42  7,949  8.51  86.24  12.14  0.39  104.33
Turkey 22  1974  1996  1,189.25  220.59 8.61  6,161  12.39  27.79  27.73  0.21  118.09
Uruguay 20  1978  1997  153.97  13.04 1.46  7,660  12.80  42.30 65.45  0.47  75.01
Venezuela 27  1970  1996  616.19  58.00 3.99  9,166  9.47  48.32 37.19  0.23  117.09
Zimbabwe 12 1979 1993 56.51 38.74 1.74 3,498 17.21 47.46 3.75 0.12 147.62
Note:  * Reported statistics are averages over all valid observations for the 1980s.  
Figure 1: Employment Growth and Openness 
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(b) Trade Share 
 Figure 2: Real Wage Growth and Openness 
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(b) Trade Share Figure 3:  Employment Growth and Labor Market Rigidity 
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(b) Aggregate Labor Market Rigidity Index 
 
 Figure 4: Real Wage Growth and Labor Market Rigidity 
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(b) Aggregate Labor Market Rigidity Index 
 